Warsaw Uprising Redux

In 1994 the Baltimore Sun published an editorial commemorating the Warsaw Uprising.  The Sun piece took the standard Polish nationalist position squarely blaming the Soviet refusal to aid the Uprising for its defeat and heavy civilian losses that followed.  However, conveniently forgotten was a more nuanced view that the Soviet refusal to aid the Uprising was a result of the combination of several factors: their initial inability to continue the Belorussian Strategic Offensive against the Germans, the Polish staunch anti-Soviet stance and a refusal to make any political compromise, and the Western Allies unwillingness to provide any meaningful support to the Uprising. 

Adding this more nuanced view to the conversation was the main reason I decided to write a letter to Sun’s editor, an edited version of which was published in The Sun.  Not surprisingly, it provoked angry responses from the readers.  I was accused of many unsavory things, including harboring Communist sympathies, which ironically has some truth in it.  I use the qualifier “some” because, I usually try to take a nuanced view and abstain from radical bombast, either in favor or against. 

Since August is the month of Polish national martyrdom prominently exemplified by the Warsaw Uprising, I findit a good opportunity to post the letter I wrote some 18 years ago.

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October 7, 1994

Editor,

The Sun

501 N. Calvert St.

Baltimore, MD 21278

Editor,

Your October 7 [1994] editorial “When Warsaw Dies Again” is high on rhetoric but thin on historical substance.  Taking a high moral ground and accusing the Soviets of betraying the Polish Resistance fighting in Warsaw is inconsistent with historical evidence.

Angered by the Western Allies position on Poland’s postwar boundaries (eventually ratified at the Yalta Conference) that shifted these boundaries westward, resulting in the loss of territories east of the Curzon line, the internally divided Polish government-in-exile in London took a radical anti-Soviet position and refused any bona fide negotiations with Stalin, even though the boundary changes resulted in a net economic gain for Poland.  While the backward semi-feudal agriculture prevailed on the eastern territories seceded to the USSR, the newly gained from Germany area was highly industrialized.  As a result, Poland’s post-war industrial infrastructure actually increased by some 50% as compared to the pre-war level.  However, the agrarian interests, dominating the Polish government-in-exile, never accepted the loss of their feudal privileges and were determined to fight for them “to the last Pole.” The nationalists, led by General Sosnkowski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish forces in exile, hoped to restore Poland’s pre-war boundaries, even if that meant fighting against both the Germans and the approaching Red Army. The plans for an uprising launched by the local Resistance forces loyal to the London government were a key element of that strategy.

The irrationality of that position can be evidenced by the following facts.

·         The Roosevelt administration clearly informed the Polish government-in-exile that the Western Allies did not intend, under any circumstances, support the planned uprising in Warsaw.  That information was never passed to the Resistance commanders in Warsaw who, to the very end, planned the Uprising on the assumption that Western aid would come.

·         Western Allies lacked the technical capability of carrying air raids over Poland on their own.  Consequently, after the Uprising broke out, they refused to send anything but largely symbolic supply missions to Warsaw.  The losses were heavy and most of the supplies were intercepted by the Germans.  General Sosnkowski, frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the Allies, ordered the Polish parachute brigade to take a kamikaze mission to Warsaw. Fortunately, his orders were ignored.

·         The Soviet government offered military assistance to the Uprising in exchange for certain political concessions; including the resignation of some of the hardline anti-Soviet cabinet members in the Polish government-in-exile.  These resignations were also demanded by the British government.  The Polish government refused the offer.

·         As the Red Army vanguards reached Warsaw suburbs, they were running out of fuel and supplies, and faced a powerful counter-offensive by the German forces.  Most sources agree that the Soviets were not capable of aiding the Resistance fighters in Warsaw, at least within the first few weeks of the Uprising.  While the Polish intelligence adequately informed London about the combat capability of the Red Army, that information was never transmitted back to the Resistance command in Warsaw.  Consequently, the order to start the Uprising relied almost exclusively on information submitted by the commanders of the Resistance combat units, who lacked skills in intelligence gathering.

These facts suggest that the responsibility for the Uprising’s defeat, and heavy “collateral damage” resulting from it, falls primarily on the Polish government-in-exile.  It is utterly naive to expect that the Soviets would aid an effort ostensibly directed against their own interests, without attaching a political price tag to their support.  Would the Kennedy administration help Fidel Castro?  However, Polish nationalists, blinded by staunch anti-Sovietism, refuse to acknowledge their own political myopia, and blame the Allies for their own mistakes.