Warsaw Uprising Redux

In 1994 the Baltimore Sun published an editorial commemorating the Warsaw Uprising.  The Sun piece took the standard Polish nationalist position squarely blaming the Soviet refusal to aid the Uprising for its defeat and heavy civilian losses that followed.  However, conveniently forgotten was a more nuanced view that the Soviet refusal to aid the Uprising was a result of the combination of several factors: their initial inability to continue the Belorussian Strategic Offensive against the Germans, the Polish staunch anti-Soviet stance and a refusal to make any political compromise, and the Western Allies unwillingness to provide any meaningful support to the Uprising. 

Adding this more nuanced view to the conversation was the main reason I decided to write a letter to Sun’s editor, an edited version of which was published in The Sun.  Not surprisingly, it provoked angry responses from the readers.  I was accused of many unsavory things, including harboring Communist sympathies, which ironically has some truth in it.  I use the qualifier “some” because, I usually try to take a nuanced view and abstain from radical bombast, either in favor or against. 

Since August is the month of Polish national martyrdom prominently exemplified by the Warsaw Uprising, I findit a good opportunity to post the letter I wrote some 18 years ago.

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October 7, 1994

Editor,

The Sun

501 N. Calvert St.

Baltimore, MD 21278

Editor,

Your October 7 [1994] editorial “When Warsaw Dies Again” is high on rhetoric but thin on historical substance.  Taking a high moral ground and accusing the Soviets of betraying the Polish Resistance fighting in Warsaw is inconsistent with historical evidence.

Angered by the Western Allies position on Poland’s postwar boundaries (eventually ratified at the Yalta Conference) that shifted these boundaries westward, resulting in the loss of territories east of the Curzon line, the internally divided Polish government-in-exile in London took a radical anti-Soviet position and refused any bona fide negotiations with Stalin, even though the boundary changes resulted in a net economic gain for Poland.  While the backward semi-feudal agriculture prevailed on the eastern territories seceded to the USSR, the newly gained from Germany area was highly industrialized.  As a result, Poland’s post-war industrial infrastructure actually increased by some 50% as compared to the pre-war level.  However, the agrarian interests, dominating the Polish government-in-exile, never accepted the loss of their feudal privileges and were determined to fight for them “to the last Pole.” The nationalists, led by General Sosnkowski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish forces in exile, hoped to restore Poland’s pre-war boundaries, even if that meant fighting against both the Germans and the approaching Red Army. The plans for an uprising launched by the local Resistance forces loyal to the London government were a key element of that strategy.

The irrationality of that position can be evidenced by the following facts.

·         The Roosevelt administration clearly informed the Polish government-in-exile that the Western Allies did not intend, under any circumstances, support the planned uprising in Warsaw.  That information was never passed to the Resistance commanders in Warsaw who, to the very end, planned the Uprising on the assumption that Western aid would come.

·         Western Allies lacked the technical capability of carrying air raids over Poland on their own.  Consequently, after the Uprising broke out, they refused to send anything but largely symbolic supply missions to Warsaw.  The losses were heavy and most of the supplies were intercepted by the Germans.  General Sosnkowski, frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the Allies, ordered the Polish parachute brigade to take a kamikaze mission to Warsaw. Fortunately, his orders were ignored.

·         The Soviet government offered military assistance to the Uprising in exchange for certain political concessions; including the resignation of some of the hardline anti-Soviet cabinet members in the Polish government-in-exile.  These resignations were also demanded by the British government.  The Polish government refused the offer.

·         As the Red Army vanguards reached Warsaw suburbs, they were running out of fuel and supplies, and faced a powerful counter-offensive by the German forces.  Most sources agree that the Soviets were not capable of aiding the Resistance fighters in Warsaw, at least within the first few weeks of the Uprising.  While the Polish intelligence adequately informed London about the combat capability of the Red Army, that information was never transmitted back to the Resistance command in Warsaw.  Consequently, the order to start the Uprising relied almost exclusively on information submitted by the commanders of the Resistance combat units, who lacked skills in intelligence gathering.

These facts suggest that the responsibility for the Uprising’s defeat, and heavy “collateral damage” resulting from it, falls primarily on the Polish government-in-exile.  It is utterly naive to expect that the Soviets would aid an effort ostensibly directed against their own interests, without attaching a political price tag to their support.  Would the Kennedy administration help Fidel Castro?  However, Polish nationalists, blinded by staunch anti-Sovietism, refuse to acknowledge their own political myopia, and blame the Allies for their own mistakes.

What's So Outrageous About Pussy Riots

The sentencing of the Pussy Riot collective for an act of "hooliganism" in a Moscow church provoked a world-wide reaction.  Particularly surprising, at least to a Western observer, is not just the harshness of the sentence but also the medieval reaction of the majority of the Russian society, condemning the three women for their act.

Mark Ames is up to something when he writes:

"Part of the hostility to Pussy Riot is that they’ve become a cause-célèbre in the West. Russians have not had a very good historical experience with things the West think Russia should do, going back a few centuries — the memory of America’s support for that drunken buffoon Yeltsin while he let the country and its people sink into misery is still raw — "a painful memory" like John Turturro's character says in "Miller's Crossing," a memory woven tightly into the Russian RNA’s spool of historical grievances. And nothing triggers that reactionary Russian live-wire gene like an earful of Westerners moralizing about any topic, even the most obvious topic, even the topic where it’s 100% clear we’re on the right side for once."

However, he misses another dark aspect of the Russian soul - sexism. If the stunt in question was done by a bunch of young men, the mob's reaction would certainly be very much different.

To be sure, counter-cultural protesters receive a raw treatment from the police and mainstream society in most so-called democratic countries, including the US and Canada.   David Graeber makes a good point about it in his book "Direct Action." The reason is that such protest questions the tacit authority relations in society and this pisses a lot of people off, because it reminds them how much they suck up to authority in everyday life and call it "choice" and "freedom".  They are being spat in their faces by their bosses and the powers that be and they think it is raining, but as soon as someone unmasks those power relations for everyone to see, their self-image is shattered, they get mad and curse the messenger.

But it also matters who the messenger is, especially in predominantly "traditional" societies where stereotypical gender roles are still an integral part of the popular culture.  If the questioning of tacit authority relations that requires guts and taking personal risks is done by men - it goes with the sexist stereotype of male "bravery," fearlessness, boldness, chutzpah etc.  It is therefore more acceptable in such societies, even if it reveals some inconvenient truths.  But the situation changes dramatically if such acts are performed by women - which not only reveals some inconvenient truths but also goes against deeply embedded gender roles.  A good Russian woman is supposed to be prone, accept her fate and pray - especially in church - not to fight back.  Acting against this stereotype is not just inconvenient - it touches a raw nerve.


As Barrington Moore observed in his book "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", to maintain traditional value systems, “human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology. To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one generation to the next."

This is particularly evident in many countries of Asia or Africa, especially those facing the challenges of modernization. In Saudi Arabia, Iran or Pakistan they punish women for far less serious "offences" against the so-called "public morals." Going medieval and insisting on strict adherence to "tradition" or rather its caricature created for propaganda purposes seem to be a common reaction of mobs being threatened by social change.  I do not think Russia is a particularly outrageous example of this. However, Russia is not seen as a "backward third world country" but rather as a relatively modern world power.  Hence such a medieval reaction against a rather benign act of three women appears more shocking. I am pretty sure, however, that similar attitudes can be found in the so-called industrialized democracies of Western Europe or America - they just do not get as much publicity.