One of the most important corollaries of these theories of
class is the claim that class membership determines collective interests of its
members (“class interests”) and this in turn can predict behavior. This is link between empirically observable “objective”
characteristics and subjective states of mind (interests) and their outcomes
(behavior) are the main draw of this argument for empirical social scientists,
such as myself. It is so, because it
allows a “clean” causal argument without falling into the chicken and egg
fallacy that often plagues arguments about states of mind and behavior. “Why did he do it?” “It was in his best interest?” “And how do we know it was in his best interest?” “Because he did it. He would have done it if it were not in his
interests.” Class membership makes it
possible to empirically define interests without relying on the alleged
empirical manifestations of those interests, i.e. purposive behavior.
I am currently involved in a book project, to which I am a
major contributor, whose central premise is a relationship between
socio-economic class and institutional social security arrangement. This premise is built on previous research in
the neo-Marxist tradition (Barrington Moore, Dietrich Rueschemeyer etc.)
arguing that the strength of the working class was essential for building
democratic institutions. The book
argues, in a nutshell, that the strength of the working class is essential for
building collective security arrangements - the stronger the working class the
stronger collective welfare protections arrangements (aka the welfare state),
the weaker the working class the stronger the individual welfare protection
arrangements (e.g. charitable organizations or reliance on family
networks). It is of course more complex
than that - but this is the main gist of it.
But the more I study it, the more I doubt that this premise
is true. To begin with, Australia had
historically had strong working class vis a vis landowners and industrial
bourgeoisie - yet it developed predominantly individual welfare protections and
rather weak welfare state. Her neighbor
New Zealand is in the same league. What
is more, in countries with strong collective welfare protections, like Sweden
or Norway, the push toward collective security arrangement primarily came not
from the working class but from the professionals and government
administration. Ditto for the UK, the
social welfare was spearheaded not by Labour but by professional bureaucrats
(Beveridge, etc.).
Germany is even a more telling case - social security
arrangements were first introduced by Otto von Bismarck, basically against the
wishes of both the high bourgeoisie and and labor. His main motivation was that collective
security was instrumental in his project of German unification - it created a
sense of collective "German interests" while neutralizing radical
elements among high bourgeoisie and militant labor. Similarly in the Netherlands and Belgium -
collective security was an element in a defense mobilization against the German
threat in the 1930s.
In short, the connection between working class and
collective security arrangements is at best dubious, if existing at all. The question is why, because on the surface
such collective welfare security arrangements are in the material interests of
the working class. Of course, the
significance of it for the US is quite obvious - it raises the question why
would a significant proportion of the 99 percent who would materially benefit
from collective welfare arrangements actively oppose such arrangements (the
What is the Matter with Kansas thing).
The standard explanation of this is based on the "false
consciousness" thesis - that people have been duped in one way or another
to act against their own interests, I find that explanation unsatisfactory,
because it is not an explanation at all, but a semantic argument to save the
central premise that socio-economic class is central driver of political
behavior from empirical refutation. The
refutation part comes from the fact that the purported cause (objectively
defined class interests) does not have the claimed effect (behavior leading to
the attainment of those interests). In
the same vein, a priest or a shaman may tell people to pray for rain, and if
they follow his advice and rain does not come, his answer is that they probably
did not pray hard enough.
My own thinking goes in a different direction - that broad
concepts of class based on a single distinguishing factor, such as the
relations to the means of production - are not very useful and bound to produce
falsehoods like every other generalization.
We need to define class in a more precise way by taking into account
several other factors in addition to the relations to the means of production,
including occupational status, level of formal education, cultural preferences
(thank you Bourdieu) as well as socio-demographic factors such as gender,
ethnicity or nationality. From that point
of view, evangelicals and tea party supporters in the US form a class - but it
is unclear how to define that class.
Calling them petite bourgeoisie does not do it because it is based on
the false consciousness assumption - those members of the working class that do
not have working class consciousness must be petite bourgeoisie. Moreover, petite bourgeoisie referred mainly
to small shop owners - and most evangelicals and tea party followers do not
belong to this category.
So this raises the first question - what defines them as a
class? It may sound like an academic
hair splitting, but it entails a serious problem of practical
consequences. If people have objectively
defined class interests, why do they act against those interests?” If we accept that they are rational actors
i.e. know what they are doing, it stands to logic that the claimed connection
between class interests and behavior is not supported by facts. Ideologues and religionists may not want to
be bothered with facts, but empirical social scientists do not want facts
contradicting their theories.
The second issue is how class interests are defined. The simplistic - and false - answer is that
every individual knows his/her best interests and those interests are
aggregated to a collective level by some spontaneous process. That is basically the classical and neo-classical
economic theory, which I may add is grounded in Anglo-Saxon individualism. In reality we know that people can hardly
agree on anything, let alone such nebulous concepts like "class
interests." Studies show that even
in formal organizations, which have much tighter rules and control mechanisms
than socio-economic classes - there is always a struggle in defining what the
goals and interests of the organization are.
So for socio-economic class - it is far more difficult and contentious
to define class interests.
My own thinking goes in a different direction again - class
interests do not emerge from below but are rather imposed from above, by a
vanguard party if you will. However,
there are many cliques vying for the status of the vanguard party, and the
question is which one of them actually becomes one. My hypothetical answer to this question is
the clique that faces the least resistance and opposition - which is consistent
with institutional theories organizational behavior. In other words - the clique that expresses
views that look most in line with what is consistent with the "stock
knowledge" or a set of beliefs and value taken for granted by members of a
given collective - be it organization or nascent socio-economic class becomes
its vanguard party that defines the class interests and class itself.
To sum it up, socio-economic class is defined not by some
objective characteristics of its members but by the vanguard party being
followed by members of that class. That
is to say, social classes are social spaces created by various cliques vying for
the status of the vanguard party that attract different followers. This is pretty much like sports team and
their fans - the “you will build they will come” thing. People may like sports in general, but that
does not translate into liking football, soccer or baseball, let alone
following a particular team. The reverse
is true - sports teams create particular sports and niches within those sports
which gradually attract followers. In
the same fashion, tea party followers are a class because the "vanguard"
tea party defines them as class and they consider that claim to be
legitimate.
Stated differently, social classes are socially constructed. They are constructed by vanguard parties, small
groups of professional activists or leaders who articulate collective interests
of other people (organizations, communities, nations, etc). These articulated interests act as a catalyst
attracting different followers who adopt them as legitimate expressions of
their own views. How much following a particular articulation of interests
attracts depends on three broadly defined factors: the affinity of that
articulation to the “stock knowledge” of a particular grouping of people, the
opposition this articulation faces from competing vanguard parties and from the
broader environment, and the relevance and plausibility of the articulation to
address a specific set of problems faced by the prospective followers. Anyone can belong to that class regardless of
occupation, relations to the means of production, cultural background, gender,
ethnicity etc. There may be correlations
between these characteristics and membership in different classes, but they
just that - correlations not causes or defining factors.
